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determine wage gain in a transition and a
non-transition economy?
The case of east and west Germany.∗
Joachim Wolff
Institute for Employment Research,
Regensburger Str. 104, D-90478 Nuremberg, email: Joachim.Wolff@iab.de
Abstract
This paper studies individual log real wage change of east and west Germans
over the period 1990/91 to 1995/96 using data from the German Socio-economic
Panel. Parameters are estimated by median regression. Human capital theory
and job mobility theories have implications for wage changes that differ between
a transition and a non-transition economy. Wage changes decrease in experience
according to human capital theory. But during a transition shock the introduc-
tion of new production techniques implies that experienced and inexperienced
workers invest similarly in on-the-job training. Hence, annual wage changes do
not vary much with experience. The estimation results reflect this difference.
Matching and on-the-job search theory imply the following: A higher a worker’s
experience the higher his/her match quality and in turn the less (more) he/she
can gain (lose) from an additional voluntary (involuntary) job change. But a
transition shock destroys the high match quality of many experienced workers’
jobs, so that wage changes due to voluntary and involuntary job change vary
less with experience in a transition country than in a non-transition country.
For involuntary job change, I find evidence for this hypothesis. Causal effects of
job mobility on wages are estimated by comparing wage changes of this period
movers with wage changes of next period movers. The results show that volun-
tary job changes raise real wages of both east and west Germans; involuntary
changes tend to lower real hourly wages.
JEL classification: J31, J63 and P23
Keywords: Wage change, median regression, job mobility, economies in
transition
∗The data used in this study are from the public use version of the German Socio-economic Panel
Study. These data were provided by the Deutsches Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung.
1 Introduction
This study analyses the individual determinants of real wage change during the first
six years of the east German transition process. Its focus is on wage change that is
associated with job change. Moreover results for east Germans workers are compared
with results for west Germans workers, to reveal particular effects of the transition
process. The data used in the analysis is the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP).
It has the advantage, in contrast to other data sets, to provide the relevant information
for both German regions for the first years of the east German transition process
(1990/91 to 1995/96). The parameters of log wage change equations are estimated by
median regression.
There is already a large literature on the determinants of wage differentials in east
Germany. Most of these studies rely on cross-sectional wage equations.1 However, to
my knowledge only one study, Hunt (2001), analyses individual determinants of real
wage change using panel data from the GSOEP and is concerned at the same time with
the effects of job change on the wage outcome. Hunt (2001) studies the determinants of
wage gain during the first six years of the east German transition process, as this study
does. In these six years after the introduction of the German Economic, Monetary and
Social Union in July 1990 the real consumption wages of east German workers aged 18
to 54 rose by 83 % (Hunt, 2001, p. 190). In particular, Hunt quantified to what extent
the median annual wage change is associated with job mobility. However, her study is
rather descriptive. It does not regard important specific predictions of human capital
theory and job mobility theories for the transition process. Nor, does she attempt to
quantify the causal effect of job mobility on wages.
There are well known implications of human capital and job mobility theories for wage
changes. Human capital theory predicts that workers accumulate general and job-
specific human capital, while working. The amount of time that they invest in these
types human capital accumulation though decreases with experience, as their time
horizon to achieve a net gain from such investment becomes shorter. The implication
is that real wages rise with experience and tenure at a decreasing rate in a non-transition
country.
For a transition country there are reasons to assume that this empirical implication
is different. One may expect that an additional year of experience is not associated
with a wage change that differs much between inexperienced and experienced workers.
1Examples of these studies are Bird, Schwarze, and Wagner (1994), Burda and Schmidt (1997),
Kru¨ger and Pischke (1997), Steiner and Puhani (1997), Steiner and Wagner (1997), Franz and Steiner
(2000) and Gang and Yun (2002).
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The restructuring of firms implies that both types of workers have to adapt to new
techniques in the production process. Hence, they accumulate human capital on-the-
job in a more similar way than in a non-transition country.
In this paper I will particularly focus on predictions of matching and on-the-job search
theories that differ between a transition and a non-transition economy. The studies
of Wolff and Tru¨bswetter (2003) and of Wolff (2004) highlighted that job mobility in
east Germany during the first years of the transition shock was far higher than in west
Germany during the first years of the transition shock.
Theories of job mobility, on-the-job search and matching theory (e.g., see Burdett,
1978; Jovanovic, 1979) predict that workers change their job until the expected present
value of the cost of job search is no higher than the expected present value of a job
change. Moreover, the more experienced workers are, the higher tends to be their wage
and job match quality. A voluntary job change should lead to a real wage gain, but
this gain should be decreasing in experience. The reason is that more experienced
workers in contrast to less experienced ones tend to work in high quality job matches
and therefore have less scope to still raise their wages by job change. For this reason
also wage losses due to involuntary job change should rise with experience.2 Naturally,
another reason for this may be the loss of job-specific skills of involuntary job changers.
The analysis controls for tenure in the previous job to account for this. These are effects
that one should expect for a non-transition country.
But theories of job mobility can have different empirical implications for a transition
economy. The transition process is an adverse shock to many of the old job matches.
Therefore, a high match quality that many experienced workers had achieved under
socialism was very frequently destroyed. In turn experienced workers can achieve gains
from voluntary job mobility that are similar to those of inexperienced workers. More-
over, in case of an involuntary job loss they do not necessarily face higher wage losses
than the inexperienced workers. However, this argument assumes that the wages of
the old job-matches are sufficiently flexible, i.e., they adjust downwards as a response
to an adverse transition shock to their match quality. If they are not flexible, there
is no or little downward wage adjustment and the implications of the theories of job
mobility may be similar for the non-transition and the transition economy. All these
implications were not investigated by the paper of Hunt (2001).
The advantage of analyzing the east German transition process is simple: We can
2The assumption is that involuntary job loss is a result of an adverse shock to a job match.
Moreover, I assume that wages are not entirely flexible. Then in particular for workers in previously
high quality job matches an involuntary job change should be associated with a wage loss.
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make a judgement on the above hypotheses by comparing the effects of covariates on
wage changes of east German workers and on wage changes of west German workers.
Due to the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union in July 1990 and German
unification in October 1990, the same legal and economic framework applies to the east
and the west German region.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the econometric model and the
data. Section three presents the median regression results and discusses them together
with the main hypotheses. A summary and conclusions are provided in section four.
2 Econometric model and sample
Suppose we have the following types of determinants of an individual’s (i) logarithmic
real wage, ln(wi,t), at some point in time t : x1,i are time-invariant regressors that have
a time-constant effect, e.g., parental background. x2,i are a subgroup of such time-
invariant regressors that interact with time. In the analysis for example gender and
the highest educational degree are such regressors. Their interaction in time implies
that I allow the wage structure to change with such characteristics over time. The
next set of regressors, x3,i,t are time-varying regressors that are assumed to have a
time-constant effect on real wages and which can change by one unit only between two
subsequent points in time. The number of voluntary and involuntary moves between
jobs will be such a regressor and I assume here that the return to each such job change
is constant and only one such job change is possible between two subsequent points
in time. Moreover, individual specific unobservables and time specific unobservables
affect the logarithmic real wage. Their effects are represented by the parameters αi and
µt. Finally, an error term εi,t captures unobserved effects on ln(wi,t) that vary both
over individuals and time. Then, a linear model of the logarithmic real wage is
ln(wi,t) = β0 + x
′
1,iβ1 + (x2,i · t)′β2 + x′3,i,tβ3 + αi + µt + εi,t (1)
The time unit will be years. In first differences we get the annual change of the log
wage as
∆ln(wi,t) = x
′
2,iβ2 +∆x
′
3,i,tβ3 +∆µt +∆εi,t (2)
I modify equation 2 and assume that the error term, ∆εi,t, is made up of an individual
specific error term ui and an error term that both varies over individuals and time,
vi,t. I assume ui to be a random effect of individual specific changes of log wages. The
model is hence
∆ln(wi,t) = x
′
2,iβ2 +∆x
′
3,i,tβ3 +∆µt + ui + vi,t (3)
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I additionally introduce in this equation regressors that are time-varying in a systematic
way provided that their effect on the log real wage is non-linear. This will be different
groups of labour market experience in the analysis. I will introduce such regressors
with their value in period t− 1, x4,i,t−1.3 Their parameters hence give some insight on
whether they non-linearly determine the logarithmic real wage. E.g., human capital
theory suggests that log wages rise with experience at a decreasing rate. In turn the
annual log wage changes are lower the higher is experience. The final equation is then:
∆ln(wi,t) = x
′
2,iβ2 +∆x
′
3,i,tβ3 + x4,i,t−1β4 +∆µt + ui + vi,t (4)
So we have a model of real wage change in which we can identify the following: β
2
represents annual changes in the wage structure of different groups of individuals. β
3
is the effect of a unit increase in a time-varying covariate on the individual log real
wage. The elements of β
4
identify non-linear effects of time-varying covariates that
change systematically with time. Finally ∆µt represents annual changes in the log real
wages that stem from changes in unobservables that only vary over time and hence the
effects of time dummies. The estimated parameters will be interpret in the usual way:
[exp(βj) − 1] · 100% is the exact percentage change of the wage due to a rise of some
covariate xj by one unit. For small parameter values this percentage change can be
approximated by βj · 100%.
I use panel data to estimate the parameters of equation 4. Thus the econometric
model will take into account that ∆ln(wi,t) may depend on an individual specific effect
ui, when computing standard errors of the coefficients: Observations of the very same
individual are treated as a cluster. The method for estimating the parameters is median
regression .4 The advantage of median regression in this context is that it is less sensitive
to outliers than ordinary linear regression models.
The data stem from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). It is the only data
set that provides such information for both east and west Germany for the period
of interest from 1990 to 1996. The panel study started in west Germany already in
1984. Its first interviews in east Germany were carried out in June 1990. It provides
information on the monthly gross wage in the month prior to the interview as well as on
hours worked, so that an hourly wage can be computed. Usually the annual interviews
are carried out in late winter/early spring. The exception is the first wave for east
Germany which collected data mainly in June and July 1990. I compute real wages
of the respondents by deflating their wages with the consumer price of the region of
3I will also control for the industry at in period t − 1. Hence, if individuals change their job and
industry, the effect of the industry change will be part of the effect of the job change.
4For a discussion of this technique see Koenker and Hallock (2001).
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residence (east or west Germany) in each year. The east German consumer price index
was made comparable to the west German one (1990=1) using a computed purchasing
power parity as in Krause (1994).
The sample is selected as follows: I include observations (pairs of two subsequent years)
of respondents with at least two subsequent interviews in the period 1990/91 to 1995/96
and who were employed at these interviews and provided valid wage information to
compute their annual log wage difference. The sample is further restricted to workers
aged 18 to 53 years, who are not self-employed or on vocational training. Moreover,
only observations are kept with valid values of the covariates.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the sample. I consider three samples: east
Germans in 1990/91, the first year of the transition process, east Germans from 1991/92
to 1995/96, and west Germans over the entire period from 1990/91 to 1995/96.5 The
first and third row show that there are immense differences in the average change of
log monthly and of log hourly real wages of these samples. The average change of log
monthly wages of east Germans in the first year of the transition process is 0.189, while
in the remainder part of the observation period it is only about half as high. For west
Germans over the entire period we have an average log monthly wage change of 0.03
that is far smaller than for east Germans.
Let me turn your attention to the last five rows in Table 1 which represent covariates
of job change. “∆ working in west” is a covariate that takes on the value 0 if there is
no change in the region of the job. It is 1 if there is a change of job from east to west
Germany and -1 if the move is in the other direction.6 This covariate is not considered
for west Germans as the number of west German sample members changing their job
form the west to the east German region is very small. The other job change covariates
are binary variables that take on the value 0 if no such move occurred and 1 otherwise.
Voluntary move mainly refers to a quit.7, 8 Involuntary movers are respondents who
were either dismissed, whose company closed or whose temporary contract terminated.
The final group “other move reason” identifies respondents who moved for other reasons
or did not provide a reason for their job end. The groups is extremely small in size.
5The two periods for east Germans were chosen as in Hunt (2001).
6This does not imply that there also must be a change in the region of residence.
7The GSOEP collects information on the month of a job end and the reason for such a job end
retrospectively each year. The respondents are asked to specify the calendar month of a job end both
for the last calendar year and for the interview year. The wage information in each wave refers to the
month prior to the interview month. Hence, I used the job end information to determine the reason
of a job end that occurred between the months of two subsequent wage observations of an individual.
8I also categorized a few individuals who responded to the reason for job end question with “end of
training” or “leave of absence”, provided they did not return to their employer, as voluntary movers.
They make up less than five percent of the voluntary moves.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
∆ Log monthly wage 0.189 (0.350) 0.096 (0.248) 0.030 (0.206)
Log monthly wage 7.391 (0.361) 7.778 (0.396) 8.022 (0.498)
∆ Log hourly wage 0.285 (0.457) 0.082 (0.304) 0.029 (0.258)
Log hourly wage 2.172 (0.314) 2.580 (0.377) 2.925 (0.386)
Female 0.485 0.471 0.391
Foreign . . 0.272
General schooling 0.027 0.020 0.254
University 0.107 0.128 0.110
Apprenticeship 0.607 0.583 0.404
Vocational training 0.259 0.269 0.232
Experience:
< 6 years 0.068 0.048 0.046
6 to 10 years 0.137 0.125 0.174
11 to 15 years 0.207 0.206 0.186
16 to 20 years 0.164 0.203 0.153
21 to 25 years 0.165 0.173 0.141
26 to 30 years 0.121 0.130 0.147
> 30 years 0.138 0.115 0.152
Tenure (months) 135.5 (105.4) 103.9 (104.0) 111.9 (96.5)
Working in west . 0.090 .
Job Change:
Stay with the firm 0.836 0.909 0.938
Voluntary move 0.081 0.039 0.040
Involuntary move 0.076 0.049 0.018
Other move reason 0.007 0.003 0.004
∆ working in west 0.051 0.005 .
Sample size 1498 6050 15005
a Undifferenced variables refer to the value of covariate at t− 1, the start of a year pair,
differenced values represent the first difference of some variable, ∆xt = xt − xt−1.
b The number of months between two subsequent interviews is not always 12. But the change of
the log wage represents an annualized change. From the raw data of a respondent the average
monthly rate of wage increase between two interviews was computed. This rate was then
assumed to be constant to compute the wage rise over one year and in turn the annualized log
wage change.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that voluntary moves where quite important
for east Germans in the first year of the transition process at 8 % of the sample. In the
next five years the corresponding number is only about half as a high for east Germans
and roughly as high as for west Germans (column 3). But not surprisingly involuntary
moves are more frequent among east than among west Germans. At 7.6 % in 1990/91
and 4.9 % in the years between 1991/92 and 1995/96 in both subperiods east German
respondents are characterised by a much higher percentage of involuntary job changers
than west German respondents at only 1.8 %.
Table 2 displays the median of the change in the log monthly wage of stayers and
compares it to that of voluntary and involuntary movers. Note first, that these numbers
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are quite similar to those presented in Hunt (2001). Note next, that compared with
stayers in the first year of the east German transition process voluntary movers and
involuntary movers are characterised by a higher median log monthly wage change. For
west Germans and east Germans over the period 1991/92 to 1995/96 instead it is lower
for involuntary movers than for stayers.
Table 2: Median of changes in log monthly wages of stayers, voluntary
movers and involuntary movers
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
Stay with the firm 0.127 0.072 0.018
Voluntary move 0.443 0.113 0.083
Involuntary move 0.216 0.039 0.001
In the Appendix Table A1 I compare some descriptive statistics and regression results
to those presented in the related study of Hunt (2001). The appendix also discusses
differences between the definitions of types of job change in this and in Hunt’s study.
Instead of defining them mainly as respondents who quit their job, voluntary movers
are much more broadly defined in her study.
3 Median regression results
The parameters of all specifications presented in this section were estimated by median
regression for both the change in log real monthly earnings and log real hourly wages.
They are estimated separately for the entire sample and for men only. The observation
period includes wage changes from 1990/91 to 1995/96. For east German workers I
estimated two separate equations for each of the periods 1990/91, a period of extremely
rapid real wage growth, and 1991/92 to 1995/96. For west Germans I only consider
one equation for the entire period.
Base specification
The first specification controls for gender, different experience9 and education groups,
tenure, and type of job change. I also add controls for industry and year dummies,
provided that several years of data are pooled.10 For the sample of East Germans in
the period 1991/92 to 1995/96, I additionally control for working in the west (German
region). I concentrate the discussion on the key covariates: Experience and type of job
change (whether an employer change leads to working in west Germany, whether the
9Experience is computed as age − 6 − years of full-time education.
10I control for eight industry dummies and year dummies for each period except for the first reference
period.
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employer change was voluntary, involuntary or due to other reasons). Table 3 presents
the coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors for the first specification.11 The first
two columns present the estimation results for east Germans in the period 1990/91.
The third and fourth column do so for east Germans for 1991/92 to 1995/96, while the
last two columns display the results for the pooled observations of west Germans over
the period 1990/91 to 1995/96.
The first seven coefficients represent effects of experience dummies. The reference
individual has less than six years of experience. For east Germans in both periods
there is very little variation of the change of log annual earnings over experience groups
(column one and three). The same holds for the change of log hourly wages over 1991/92
to 1995/96 period. Only for the first year of the east German transition process (column
2) the coefficients imply that the log hourly wage change tends to depend negatively on
experience: The two highest experience groups (26 to 30 years and more than 30 years)
are characterised by an annual wage change that is more than four percent lower than
for the reference group. However, these differences are not well determined. This is
what we would have expected for a transition economy, where due the introduction of
new production techniques experienced as well as inexperienced workers invest similarly
in on-the-job training. In contrast, the annual wage change of west Germans over the
period 1990/91 to 1995/96 generally tends to decrease in experience and many of the
differences to the reference group are significant. E.g., for the hourly wage (column
six), the experience group 6 to 10 years already gains more than two percent less than
the reference group. The experience groups 26 to 30 and more than 30 years even gain
roughly four percent less than workers with less than six years of experience.12
Now turn to the coefficients on job changes: The reference group are stayers. The
effects of a voluntary and an involuntary move/job change represent effects of job
changes within the region. The comparison group are stayers. Between 1990 and 1991,
voluntary job change is associated with a significant and substantial rise of earnings
of east Germans of close to 14 %, while the hourly wage rise is much lower at 3.6
% and badly determined. The coefficients for voluntary change in column three and
four of Table 3 imply for the period from 1991/92 to 1995/96 that the monthly and
111000 bootstraps were performed.
12The effect of on-the-job training on wages and hence annual wage changes may work through
experience (general human capital accumulation) and through tenure (job-specific human capital ac-
cumulation). In order to see their combined effect on wage changes one should actually not include
a tenure control. I nevertheless included a linear term for tenure in the specifications as a control
variable. Tenure could also measure other types of impacts on wage changes than the accumulation of
job-specific-human capital like the taste for mobility of the worker. I have estimated the specifications
also without this tenure control variable and the results do not change considerably.
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Table 3: Base specification, entire sample (coefficients)a
Dependent variable: ∆ln(w)
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly
Female 0.0243 0.0118 0.0103 0.011 -0.001 -0.002
(0.015) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreigner . . . . -0.006 -0.0018
. . . . 0.002 (0.003)
Experience:
6 to 10 years -0.0058 -0.0173 0.0138 -0.0056 -0.0179 -0.0211
(0.033) (0.040) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008)
11 to 15 years 0.0018 -0.0188 -0.0059 -0.019 -0.027 -0.0273
(0.031) (0.039) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008)
16 to 20 years -0.0045 -0.0179 -0.0123 -0.0236 -0.0334 -0.0328
(0.032) (0.043) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008)
21 to 25 years -0.014 -0.0216 -0.0077 -0.013 -0.035 -0.0355
(0.036) (0.042) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008)
26 to 30 years -0.0185 -0.0406 -0.0128 -0.0116 -0.0409 -0.0418
(0.041) (0.048) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008)
> 30 years -0.0297 -0.0427 -0.0154 -0.0117 -0.0403 -0.0379
(0.039) (0.045) (0.016) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008)
General schooling 0.0824 0.0885 -0.0101 0.0001 -0.0052 -0.0038
(0.072) (0.062) (0.022) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
General schooling (foreign) . . . . -0.0043 -0.004
. . . . 0.004 (0.004)
University -0.0683 -0.086 0.014 0.0174 0.0011 -0.0052
(0.019) (0.029) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
Vocational training -0.033 -0.0559 -0.0044 -0.0097 -0.0027 -0.0007
(0.017) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure (months)/1000 -0.0162 0.0056 0.0377 -0.0078 -0.02 -0.0385
(0.079) (0.111) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.046)
Works in the west . . -0.0432 -0.0487 . .
. . (0.008) (0.010) . .
Voluntary move 0.1301 0.0358 0.0478 0.0388 0.0456 0.0488
(0.045) (0.047) (0.024) (0.024) (0.009) (0.011)
Involuntary move 0.0589 -0.0472 -0.0391 -0.0553 -0.0237 -0.0339
(0.040) (0.039) (0.022) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020)
Other move reason 0.289 0.3525 0.0325 -0.0047 -0.0133 -0.022
(0.216) (0.254) (0.049) (0.065) (0.039) (0.063)
∆ working in west 0.4191 0.3669 0.0819 0.0868 . .
(0.056) (0.086) (0.038) (0.029) . .
Constant 0.3204 0.3786 0.1602 0.1372 0.0431 0.0563
(0.056) (0.057) (0.019) (0.020) (0.006) (0.009)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies . Yes Yes
# of obs. 1498 6050 15005
Pseudo-R2 0.102 0.071 0.050 0.029 0.012 0.008
a Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
hourly wage rise of voluntary job changers is much more similar at 4.8 % and about
four percent, respectively. But these two coefficients are insignificant. Compared with
these latter two figures the corresponding west German wage gain of voluntary job
9
changers is of a similar order of magnitude.
For involuntary job change I find a six percent monthly wage gain and roughly five
percent hourly wage loss for east Germans between 1990 and 1991. But both coefficients
are not significant. This is different for wage changes of the years 1991/92 to 1995/96,
where the monthly earnings loss associated with an involuntary change is close to
four percent and the hourly wage loss is more than five percent for east Germans.
For west Germans a statistically significant (10 % level) wage loss is associated with
involuntary job changes from 1990/91 to 1995/96. Though in absolute terms it is about
two percentage points lower than for east Germans from 1991/92 to 1995/96. I will
not comment on the coefficients of the group of job changers referred to as “other move
reason”. This group represents only very few observations.
Column one and two show that a change to west Germany in the first year of the
transition process is associated with an immense wage gain of east Germans: The
coefficients imply a (statistically significant) gain of more than 50 % on a monthly
basis and about 44 % on an hourly basis. Over the next five years of the observation
period (column three and four) though it is much lower at 8.5 to nine percent.13
Table 4 repeats the exercise of Table 3 limiting the sample to men only.14 In qualitative
terms, the results on experience for west Germans (column five and six) are similar to
those achieved with the entire sample. The differences in wage change between the six
experience groups and the reference group is though a bit more pronounced than in
Table 4. For east Germans the main message of Table 4 is that the coefficients for the
period 1991/92 to 1995/96 now imply that all experience groups are characterised by a
lower hourly wage gain than the less then six years references group. These differences
are much more pronounced than for the entire sample, but they are still insignificant.
Moreover, the hourly wage change of all the experience groups starting with six to ten
up to more than 30 years of experience is quite similar, which is still in line with the
expectations.
Some coefficients displayed in Table 4 imply remarkable differences between the results
for the male and for the entire sample. One remarkable difference in terms of size is
that involuntary job changes of east German men for the monthly wage is associated
13One may interpret these effects as additional to the effects of another type of move. Note however,
that individuals who changed the region of their job from east to west and vice versa may be individuals
who did not end their job/employer but just changed the from one workplace of their company to
another.
14I have not carried out an analysis for women only, since there is much lower job change among
female than among male workers. Nor did I display descriptive statistics for the female subsample.
They are available on request.
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Table 4: Base specification, men (coefficients)a
Dependent variable: ∆ln(w)
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly
Foreigner . . . . -0.0068 -0.0034
. . . . (0.003) (0.004)
Experience:
6 to 10 years 0.0097 0.024 0.012 -0.0302 -0.0213 -0.0301
(0.057) (0.066) (0.024) (0.034) (0.009) (0.013)
11 to 15 years 0.0142 -0.027 -0.0054 -0.03 -0.0283 -0.0336
(0.052) (0.062) (0.025) (0.034) (0.008) (0.012)
16 to 20 years 0.0052 0.0229 -0.0035 -0.0257 -0.0364 -0.039
(0.053) (0.068) (0.025) (0.034) (0.008) (0.012)
21 to 25 years -0.0039 -0.0169 0.0008 -0.025 -0.0399 -0.0461
(0.062) (0.067) (0.025) (0.033) (0.008) (0.013)
26 to 30 years 0.019 0.0225 -0.0203 -0.0409 -0.0449 -0.0518
(0.069) (0.073) (0.026) (0.034) (0.008) (0.012)
> 30 years -0.0063 -0.0365 -0.0237 -0.0325 -0.0451 -0.0484
(0.061) (0.064) (0.025) (0.035) (0.008) (0.013)
General schooling 0.1245 0.162 -0.006 0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0006
(0.130) (0.118) (0.038) (0.033) (0.004) (0.005)
General schooling (foreign) . . . . -0.0073 -0.0024
. . . . (0.004) (0.005)
University -0.0756 -0.1018 0.0114 0.0155 -0.0006 -0.0081
(0.028) (0.048) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003)
Vocational training -0.0002 0.0093 -0.0148 -0.0082 -0.0006 -0.0009
(0.033) (0.036) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003)
Tenure (months)/100 -0.0665 -0.1493 0.0503 -0.003 -0.0128 -0.0353
(0.126) (0.145) (0.033) (0.046) (0.011) (0.015)
Works in the west . . -0.0593 -0.0523 . .
. . (0.010) (0.014) . .
Voluntary move 0.148 0.0311 0.0561 0.0303 0.0433 0.0614
(0.059) (0.058) (0.026) (0.035) (0.015) (0.014)
Involuntary move 0.0988 0.0086 -0.0176 -0.0661 -0.0082 -0.0083
(0.080) (0.091) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018)
Other move reason 0.4478 0.4066 0.0068 -0.009 -0.0133 -0.0154
(0.435) (0.203) (0.117) (0.110) (0.067) (0.074)
∆ working in west 0.4281 0.4786 0.1273 0.1259 . .
(0.082) (0.110) (0.042) (0.043) . .
Constant 0.296 0.3915 0.1162 0.0935 0.0442 0.0609
(0.069) (0.067) (0.028) (0.036) (0.009) (0.014)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies . Yes Yes
# of obs. 771 3199 9136
Pseudo-R2 0.147 0.090 0.036 0.021 0.014 0.010
a Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
with a rise that is close to ten percent and nearly twice as high as for the entire sample
in the period 1990/91. Moreover, in contrast to results for the entire sample, there is
nearly no wage loss associated with involuntary job change of west German men and
it is also not well determined.
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Job change interacting with experience
Table 5 presents results of a specification that adds interactions terms between the job
change variables and two experience groups: 11 to 20 years and more than 20 years
of experience. The wage change associated with job change should be lower the more
experienced workers are in the non-transition economy. The reason is that experi-
enced workers gain less from job changes, since they are more likely than inexperienced
workers to work in good job matches. But in the transition economy this is not neces-
sarily the case: The transition process may have destroyed a high match quality that
experienced workers had achieved during their career.
The coefficients of the six experience groups as displayed by Table 5 still by and large
reflect the implications of Table 3. So let us directly turn to the effects of job change
and in particular their interaction with experience. In nearly all regressions the inter-
action terms between voluntary or involuntary moves and experience groups are badly
determined. The exception is one interaction term for the hourly wage rate of west
Germans: The coefficient for the interaction of involuntary move with more than 20
years of experience.
Most of the coefficients for quits displayed in Table 5 indicate considerable wage gains
for workers with an experience of less than 11 years. For east Germans over the period
1991/92 to 1995/96 these wage gains are statistically significant and high at a more
than 16 % rise of the monthly wage and a more than 13 % rise of the hourly wage.
For west Germans in the same experience group instead the corresponding numbers
are between five and six percent and hence much lower. There is no clear pattern for
the two higher experience groups of 11 to 20 and more than 20 years. First of all, only
in 1990/91 both interaction coefficients of east Germans imply that they do not gain
less (or even lose) in terms of monthly and hourly wages from a quit than workers with
no more than 10 years of experience. I expected this also for the period 1991/92 to
1995/96. But in this period the interaction coefficients imply that east German workers
with more than ten years experience gain much less from a voluntary job change than
those with less than 11 years of experience. For west Germans negative values of
these interaction terms were expected, as experienced workers should have less room
to improve wages by voluntary job changes than relatively inexperienced workers. The
coefficients experience interactions with voluntary quits are negative, but they are quite
small, so that the results are not in line with this hypothesis. In none of the equations
the coefficients of interactions between quits and experience are well-determined.
The coefficients of involuntary job change in Table 5 imply the following for east Ger-
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Table 5: Job change interacting with experience, entire sample
(coefficients)a
Dependent variable: ∆ln(w)
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly
Female 0.0265 0.0142 0.0107 0.0127 -0.0011 -0.0019
(0.014) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience:
6 to 10 years -0.0023 -0.0165 0.0143 -0.0045 -0.0182 -0.0215
(0.034) (0.041) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008)
11 to 15 years 0.0087 -0.0189 -0.0059 -0.0156 -0.027 -0.027
(0.032) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007)
16 to 20 years 0.0059 -0.0131 -0.0109 -0.022 -0.0332 -0.0323
(0.033) (0.044) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008)
21 to 25 years 0.0047 -0.0192 -0.0083 -0.0137 -0.0347 -0.035
(0.035) (0.043) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007)
26 to 30 years -0.013 -0.0312 -0.013 -0.0104 -0.0407 -0.041
(0.040) (0.046) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008)
> 30 years -0.022 -0.0406 -0.0158 -0.0098 -0.0397 -0.0375
(0.040) (0.045) (0.017) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008)
Works in the west . . -0.0433 -0.0507 . .
. . (0.007) (0.010) . .
Job change:
Voluntary move 0.1167 0.021 0.1529 0.1251 0.0516 0.0594
(0.083) (0.103) (0.079) (0.073) (0.013) (0.016)
Voluntary move 0.0298 0.0262 -0.1355 -0.1151 0.0011 -0.0143
x exper. 11 to 20 years (0.107) (0.116) (0.085) (0.081) (0.026) (0.026)
Voluntary move 0.0353 -0.1199 -0.0992 -0.0845 -0.0212 -0.014
x exper. > 20 years (0.159) (0.171) (0.099) (0.087) (0.024) (0.028)
Involuntary move 0.1058 0.0066 -0.0653 -0.0752 0.0013 -0.0038
(0.072) (0.093) (0.043) (0.038) (0.029) (0.021)
Involuntary move -0.0545 -0.0222 0.0347 -0.0034 -0.0329 -0.0105
x exper. 11 to 20 years (0.084) (0.112) (0.054) (0.060) (0.045) (0.042)
Involuntary move -0.1365 -0.1218 0.0359 0.0332 -0.0441 -0.0818
x exper. > 20 years (0.096) (0.108) (0.057) (0.051) (0.041) (0.031)
Other move reason 0.309 0.3385 0.0344 -0.0035 -0.0133 -0.0215
(0.221) (0.251) (0.053) (0.055) (0.037) (0.063)
∆ working in west 0.402 0.3854 0.1877 0.1731 . .
(0.094) (0.133) (0.068) (0.054) . .
∆ working in west -0.1501 -0.178 -0.0822 -0.0709 . .
x exper. 11 to 20 years (0.160) (0.204) (0.096) (0.086) . .
∆ working in west 0.0946 0.3336 -0.1697 -0.1737 . .
x exper. > 20 years (0.204) (0.230) (0.080) (0.066) . .
Constant 0.334 0.3935 0.1584 0.1366 0.043 0.0561
(0.059) (0.058) (0.019) (0.018) (0.006) (0.009)
Education, industry Yes Yes Yes
Further controls tenure tenure, year dummies foreigner, tenure,
year dummies
# of obs. 1498 6050 15005
Pseudo-R2 0.106 0.075 0.052 0.030 0.012 0.009
a Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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man workers: During the first year of the transition process (period 1990/91) those
with less than 11 years of experience gain from an involuntary move by a rise of more
than ten percent in terms of monthly wages. But for them there is nearly no hourly
wage gain. The interaction terms with experience show that the higher the experience,
the lower the monthly wage change during the first year of the transition process. In
terms of monthly wages, the more than 20 years experience group even faces a wage
loss. In terms of hourly wages both higher experience groups do so. During the period
1991/92 to 1995/96 the situation is different for east German workers. For the experi-
ence group of less than 11 years an involuntary move is associated with a wage loss of
more than 6.5 % in terms of earnings and more than 7.5 % in terms of hourly wages.
The interaction terms for the two other experience groups imply that they also face a
wage loss. But it is either the same or lower than for the less than 11 years experience
group.
The last two columns of Table 5 show that for west Germans in the low experience
group there is nearly no wage change associated with involuntary job changes. But
according to the interaction terms there is a wage loss for the two higher experience
groups which tends to increase with experience. The interaction coefficient for those
with 11 to 20 years of experience implies a decline of the monthly wage associated with
an involuntary move by about three percentage points of the hourly wage of about one
percentage point. The corresponding numbers for the more than 20 years experience
group are more than four and more than eight percent.
The results for east Germans on voluntary and involuntary job change only refer to
a change within the region. The additional wage change if the east German workers
also moved to west Germany is again considerable. Those with less than 11 years of
experience gained close to 50 % in terms of monthly and hourly wages in the period
1990/91 and close to 20 % over the period 1991/92 to 1995/96. In both periods the
change to the west is associated with a considerably lower gain for east German workers
with 11 to 20 years of experience. For the hourly wage it is roughly 24 percentage points
lower in the first period and roughly nine percentage points lower in the second period.
The more than 20 years experience group instead in the 1990/91 period gained even
more from a change to the west than the less than 11 years experience group. In
terms of hourly wages their wage rise associated with a job change to west Germany
was nearly twice that of the less than 11 years experience group. However, in the
1991/92 to 1995/96 period they nearly did not gain at all by changing from east to
west Germany.
Table 6 presents the coefficients of the same specifications estimated for the male sub-
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Table 6: Job change interacting with experience, men (coefficients)a
Dependent variable: ∆ln(w)
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly
Experience:
6 to 10 years -0.0012 0.0067 0.0217 -0.012 -0.0218 -0.0279
(0.057) (0.066) (0.024) (0.032) (0.009) (0.012)
11 to 15 years 0.0297 -0.0237 0.011 -0.0077 -0.0288 -0.0305
(0.051) (0.058) (0.025) (0.032) (0.009) (0.012)
16 to 20 years 0.0265 0.0427 0.0106 -0.0065 -0.0368 -0.0358
(0.053) (0.065) (0.024) (0.032) (0.009) (0.012)
21 to 25 years 0.0035 -0.009 0.0168 -0.0083 -0.0402 -0.0425
(0.060) (0.066) (0.025) (0.032) (0.009) (0.012)
26 to 30 years 0.0304 0.028 -0.0026 -0.0246 -0.045 -0.0486
(0.072) (0.073) (0.025) (0.033) (0.009) (0.012)
> 30 years 0.0142 -0.0144 -0.0071 -0.0136 -0.0454 -0.0445
(0.062) (0.060) (0.025) (0.032) (0.009) (0.012)
Works in the west . . -0.0546 -0.0589 . .
. . (0.010) (0.014) . .
Job change:
Voluntary 0.1422 0.0188 0.1525 0.0591 0.0489 0.0675
(0.109) (0.140) (0.069) (0.072) (0.022) (0.021)
Voluntary 0.0017 0.0247 -0.1445 -0.0649 -0.0057 -0.0057
x exper. 11 to 20 years (0.137) (0.152) (0.074) (0.086) (0.034) (0.034)
Voluntary 0.0393 0.0589 -0.0643 -0.0295 -0.0026 -0.0163
x exper. > 20 years (0.207) (0.206) (0.086) (0.095) (0.044) (0.042)
Involuntary 0.2062 0.0706 -0.0314 -0.0894 -0.003 0.0017
(0.132) (0.116) (0.071) (0.049) (0.033) (0.024)
Involuntary -0.1725 -0.0781 0.0314 0.0265 0.0039 0.0225
x exper. 11 to 20 years (0.187) (0.194) (0.078) (0.070) (0.042) (0.055)
Involuntary -0.1493 -0.2883 0.0004 0.0331 -0.0346 -0.0867
x exper. > 20 years (0.224) (0.229) (0.078) (0.062) (0.049) (0.047)
Other move reason 0.449 0.3917 0.0081 0.0383 -0.01 -0.0158
(0.423) (0.192) (0.124) (0.121) (0.066) (0.076)
∆ working in west 0.4441 0.4997 0.2144 0.2012 . .
(0.143) (0.140) (0.103) (0.082) . .
∆ working in west -0.1659 -0.3245 -0.0726 -0.0558 . .
x exper. 11 to 20 years (0.244) (0.242) (0.117) (0.136) . .
∆ working in west 0.0934 -0.0132 -0.1489 -0.1915 . .
x exper. > 20 years (0.257) (0.272) (0.121) (0.098) . .
Constant 0.3157 0.3993 0.0987 0.0733 0.0446 0.0576
(0.068) (0.069) (0.028) (0.033) (0.009) (0.013)
Education, industry Yes Yes Yes
Further controls tenure tenure, year dummies foreigner, tenure,
year dummies
# of obs. 771 3199 9136
Pseudo-R2 0.152 0.097 0.039 0.024 0.014 0.010
a Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
sample. In qualitative terms and often in quantitative terms the coefficients on job
change are by and large similar to those of the entire sample in Table 5. One im-
portant quantitative difference emerged for the hourly wage change equations of east
15
Germans in the 1991/92 to 1995/96 period. Voluntary job change of workers with less
than 11 years of experience is associated with an about six percent wage rise, which is
less than twice as high as for the entire sample.
A second difference emerges for involuntary job change of east Germans in the period
1990/91. The hourly wage change associated with an involuntary move of workers with
less than 11 years experience was close to zero for the entire sample but is above seven
percent for the male sample (column 2 of Table 6). Moreover, the additional result on
the interaction between involuntary job change and > 20 years of experience indicates
a wage loss of these high experience workers of roughly 20 % for the male sample; for
the entire sample it was only 11 percent.
A third and substantial difference to the results achieved with the entire sample emerged
for the coefficients of moving to west Germany in the 1990/91 period. The hourly wage
gain of east Germans in the less than 11 years experience group is considerably higher at
more than 64 percent than for the entire sample at only 47 percent. The corresponding
numbers for the more the 20 years experience group are about 63 % and 105 %, as
implied by their interaction terms of changing to the west with this experience group.
I interpret the results on interactions between job change and experience as follows:
First of all only in the first year of the east German transition process higher experience
is not associated with a lower wage gain from voluntary job change within the region. A
potential reason for this is that the transition shock destroyed the old job match quality
and hence a wage gain from voluntary job change should be similar for inexperienced
and experienced workers. I expected this to hold for the period 1991/92 to 1995/96,
which is not confirmed by the results. Matching theory suggests for a non-transition
economy and hence for west Germans that voluntary job change is associated with a
lower wage gain the higher is the worker’s experience: The estimated coefficients are
partly in line with this hypothesis but they are badly determined.
For involuntary job change, I find east Germans with more than 10 years of experience
to gain less and even lose in terms of hourly wages compared with east Germans
with less than 11 years of experience in the first year of the transition process. One
reason for this is that initially the transition shock did probably not affect the wages
in old job matches. Therefore, inexperienced movers who held job matches with a
relatively low match quality gained more from changing their job than experienced
movers. Yet over the period 1991/92 to 1995/96 this is different. Involuntary job
change was associated with a wage loss for east German workers but the wage loss
was no higher for experienced than for inexperienced workers. This is what I expected
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for a transition economy, provided that the wages in old job matches react flexibly to
the transition shock. In this case experienced workers become similar to inexperienced
ones in terms expected gains (or losses) in match quality from a job change.
Finally for west Germans we find nearly no wage losses associated involuntary job
change for the workers with less than 11 years of experience, while there are considerable
wage losses for those with more than 20 years of experience. This would be in line with
implications of matching or on-the-job search theory: Inexperienced workers who in
contrast to experienced ones tend to work in job matches that are still at the lower end
of the match quality distribution should face lower wage losses due to involuntary job
changes than the more experienced workers.
Causal effects of job change on wages
So far the median regression results were rather concerned with wage changes that are
associated with a job change. To quantify a causal effect, one would have to compare
the wage change of individuals who do change job in the current period with their wage
change had they stayed in their job. The latter is unobservable. The previous analysis
assumed as a comparison group stayers, but their annual wage change is unlikely to
approximate this unobservable term. Stayers may differ from movers with respect to
unobservable determinants of their annual change in wages. The analysis that follows
defines another comparison group: Workers who do stay in their job in this period
but change the job in the subsequent period.15 This implies for the stayers we need
valid information of not only two but three subsequent waves of the GSOEP so that
he/she contributes with one observation to the sample. In turn the sample sizes of this
analysis are somewhat reduced.16
Table 7 present the coefficients of this median regression analysis. The specification is
similar to that of Table 3. It additionally controls for stayers who changed their job
not in this but in the subsequent period. This is done by adding a dummy variable for
each type of their job changes (to the west, voluntary, involuntary, and other reason).
The causal effect of a specific type of job change is then computed by the difference of
the coefficient of movers in this period and the coefficient of movers in the subsequent
(next) period. These causal effects are displayed at the bottom of Table 7.
The estimated causal effects of voluntary moves on wages are higher for east than for
15This identification strategy goes back to Mincer (1986) and underlies for example the study of
Abbott and Beach (2001) on gains from job change of Canadian women.
16For the samples of east Germans the size decrease by about 27 % in the first period and 22 % in
the second period. The sample size of west Germans decreases by roughly 20 %.
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Table 7: Movers this period versus movers next period, entire sample
(coefficients)a
Dependent variable: ∆ln(w)
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly
Experience:
6 to 10 years -0.0741 -0.0643 0.0211 0.0224 -0.0145 -0.0121
(0.040) (0.053) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009)
11 to 15 years -0.0245 -0.0466 -0.0016 0.0133 -0.0232 -0.0202
(0.041) (0.052) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009)
16 to 20 years -0.0239 -0.0434 -0.0067 0.0048 -0.0283 -0.0238
(0.041) (0.052) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009)
21 to 25 years -0.028 -0.057 -0.0049 0.0145 -0.03 -0.027
(0.041) (0.051) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009)
26 to 30 years -0.0331 -0.0494 -0.0077 0.0132 -0.036 -0.0349
(0.051) (0.060) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009)
> 30 years -0.0524 -0.0565 -0.0187 0.0051 -0.0323 -0.0285
(0.052) (0.057) (0.016) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009)
Works in the west . . -0.0453 -0.0485 . .
. . (0.008) (0.011) . .
Job change:
Voluntary move 0.0741 -0.0119 0.0406 0.0269 0.0466 0.0472
this period (0.043) (0.055) (0.028) (0.026) (0.010) (0.011)
Voluntary move -0.0985 -0.0915 -0.018 -0.0304 -0.0033 0.001
next period (0.046) (0.065) (0.023) (0.029) (0.008) (0.010)
Involuntary move 0.0088 -0.1053 -0.0397 -0.0564 -0.026 -0.0374
this period (0.039) (0.042) (0.027) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018)
Involuntary move 0.0001 0.0324 -0.0232 -0.0138 0.0082 0.0241
next period (0.036) (0.044) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.010)
Other move reason 0.2209 0.236 0.0523 -0.0198 -0.0135 -0.0232
this period (0.260) (0.323) (0.063) (0.081) (0.037) (0.061)
Other move reason 0.112 -0.1501 0.0322 -0.0365 0.0547 0.0283
next period (0.020) (0.024) (0.067) (0.156) (0.031) (0.037)
∆ working in west 0.4449 0.4448 0.0883 0.0979 . .
this period (0.061) (0.089) (0.042) (0.037) . .
∆ working in west -0.0488 -0.049 0.0196 0.034 . .
next period (0.060) (0.095) (0.018) (0.022) . .
Constant 0.3904 0.445 0.1638 0.1171 0.0409 0.0526
(0.068) (0.072) (0.021) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010)
Education, industry Yes Yes Yes
Further controls female, tenure female, tenure, female, foreigner, tenure,
year dummies year dummies
# of obs. 1088 4716 12147
Pseudo-R2 0.131 0.094 0.054 0.030 0.012 0.009
Causal Effects:
Voluntary move 0.1726 0.0796 0.0586 0.0572 0.0499 0.0462
(0.062) (0.081) (0.037) (0.039) (0.013) (0.016)
Involuntary move 0.0087 -0.1377 -0.0165 -0.0426 -0.0342 -0.0615
(0.052) (0.058) (0.030) (0.040) (0.020) (0.022)
∆ working in west 0.4938 0.4937 0.0686 0.064 . .
(0.085) (0.132) (0.045) (0.040) . .
a Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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west Germans. For west Germans it is 5.1 % on a monthly basis and 4.7 % on an
hourly basis over the period 1990/91 to 1995/96. In the initial period 1990/91, the
corresponding numbers for east Germans are 18.8 % and 8.3 % and for the period
1991/92 to 1995/96 they are both about six percent. Nevertheless, the standard errors
imply that 95 % confidence bands for coefficients of west Germans would overlap with
the corresponding ones of east Germans. So we cannot be very confident about these
differences.
Now turn to the results on involuntary movers. For east Germans both in the initial
year and the period 1991/92 to 1995/96, there is only a very little monthly wage
change due to an involuntary move. On an hourly basis though their wages decrease
considerably by about 13 % in the initial year and by 4.2 % in the period 1991/92
to 1995/96. The hourly wage loss in the 1990/91 period is high compared with that
estimated for west Germans over the entire period 1990/91 to 1995/96. For them it
is only about six percent. But again 95 % confidence bands for coefficients of west
Germans would overlap with the corresponding ones of east Germans.
Finally turn to east Germans moving to west Germany. In the period 1990/91 the
wage gain of this period movers is 56 % for both the monthly and hourly wage. But
for both wage measures, the causal effect of a current period move is higher at about
64 %, since the next period movers though face a wage decrease. The causal effect for
the period 1991/92 to 1995/96 is far lower: The wage rise due to changing to the west
is 7.1 % for the monthly wage and 6.6 % for the hourly wage.17
4 Summary and conclusions
This paper analysed the determinants of real wage changes of east and of west German
workers during the period of the first six years of the east German transition. Both
changes of monthly earnings and hourly wages are considered. The focus is on effects
of experience and different types of job change on wage changes. I applied median
regression techniques to estimate these effects for different samples drawn from the
German Socio-economic Panel.
The finding suggest first of all that annual log wage changes vary less with experience
for workers in the transition economy than for workers in the non-transition economy.
Moreover, the annual wage change tends to decrease in experience for the non-transition
country. These findings are in line with hypotheses of human capital theory on the
17I estimated the same model as in Table 7 for men only. But I do not display the results, since
most of the estimated causal effects do not differ substantially from those estimated for the entire
sample. The results are available on request.
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accumulation of human capital on the job. For a non-transition economy it expects
workers to invest less in such human capital the higher their experience and hence the
lower their time horizon to reap the benefits of such an investment. Hence, wages should
increase at a declining rate with experience. In turn the annual wage changes should
decline with experience. As in a transition economy new production techniques are
introduced, the time invested in on-the-job training may vary less with the experience
of workers than in a non-transition country. Hence, there is less variation of the annual
wage change over different experience groups than in a non-transition country. And
these results imply for a transition economy in contrast to a non-transition economy
that the wage of a cohort of a experienced workers relative to that of a cohort of less
experienced ones who keep their jobs should not decrease (much) over time during the
period of the transition shock.
On-the-job search and matching theories imply that voluntary job changes should be
associated with wage rise as workers change from lower to higher job match qualities.
In a non-transition economy these wage rises should be lower the higher is a worker’s
experience. The reason is that workers with a high in contrast to a low experience in
the labour market are more likely to have achieved a relatively high match quality in
their current job match. Therefore their scope for raising the wage by a job change
is lower than for workers with a low experience. This is not naturally the case for
a transition economy, since the transition shock may destroy high match qualities
of experienced workers. Therefore, their wage gain associated with a voluntary job
change may be similar to that of inexperienced workers. But these hypotheses for the
transition economy and the non-transition economy are not supported by the findings
for east and west Germans. The estimated interaction effects between experience and
voluntary job changes do not always reflect these implications and are for all samples
badly determined.
Matching theories of job mobility also have implications with respect to the relationship
between wage changes and involuntary job change. As inexperienced workers have still
a larger scope to find better job matches than experienced ones, an involuntary job
change should be associated with higher wage losses for the latter. And this is what
I find for west Germans and hence the non-transition country. In contrast, for east
Germans at least for the period 1991/92 to 1995/96 the evidence points to wage losses
of involuntary leavers that are not higher for the experienced workers than for those
with very little experience. That may imply that the transition shock made experienced
workers similar to inexperienced ones: The high match quality of their old job match
was destroyed and their wages in the old jobs partly adjusted downwards relative to
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other wages in the economy.
Finally, I estimated causal effects of different types of job mobility. The identification
strategy was to compare the wage change of this period movers with the wage change of
stayers who move in the next period. A voluntary move causes a roughly five percent
(hourly and monthly) wage gain for west Germans. Only in the first year of the
transition process and only for their monthly wage, for east Germans this causal effect
is substantially higher at more than 17 % (for a voluntary move within the region).
But this difference to west Germans is not well determined. Involuntary job changes
do nearly not alter the monthly wages of east Germans. But they decrease their hourly
wages by nearly 14 % in the initial year of the transition process and by more than four
percent in the next five year period. The hourly wage loss of west Germans caused by
involuntary job changes is higher than six percent.
The results summarized so far are concerned with job changes within the economy. I
also quantified the additional effect of changing job from east to west Germany. Let
me only emphasize its causal effect on wages, which is not surprisingly immense. It
is estimated to lead to a more than 60 % wage rise in the first year of the transition
process. However in the following five years it is somewhat lower than ten percent.
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Appendix A: Appendix tables
The Appendix Tables compare some of the descriptives statistics of this paper with
those presented in the paper of Hunt (2001). Note that for this comparison agricultural
workers were excluded from my sample. Table A1 compares means and standard
deviations of important variables. It is clear from the table that I could not entirely
reproduce Hunt’s sample as the sample sizes are larger than those in Hunt (2001).
For many of the variables though the means and standard deviations are very similar.
This is particularly true for east Germans in the period 1990/91. Let me discuss some
important differences between the two samples. The average log wage increase in of
the subsample of west Germans over the period 1990/91 to 1995/96 is about only three
quarters of that in Hunt’s sample. Moreover for the same subsample the average tenure
is 113.3 months compared to only 93.3 months in Hunt’s sample.
There are some considerable difference concerning covariates of job change. The im-
portant difference is observed for voluntary movers whose share tends to be higher in
her sample than in mine, while her share of involuntary movers tends to be below the
one of my sample. This applies to east Germans over the period 1991/92 to 1995/96
and west Germans over the period 1990/91 to 1995/96.
One reason for these differences is that Hunt classified as involuntary movers all movers
who were either dismissed or whose company closed. All others who terminated a job
were classified as voluntary movers including those workers who terminated a fixed term
contract. Provided that respondents did not specify the reason for the job termination,
they were classified to a third category, “move reason unknown”. Within firm movers
were defined as stayers. In contrast to Hunt, I classified workers who terminated a
fixed term contract as involuntary movers and not as voluntary movers.
Moreover, for east Germans over the period 1991/92 to 1995/96 and west Germans
over the period 1990/91 to 1995/96 her share of stayers is lower than the one in my
sample. One reason for this may be that respondents state the same job end twice in
two different waves. The GSOEP asks respondents about the calendar month of a job
end between the beginning of the last calendar year and the survey year’s interview
month. Hence, a respondent over two subsequent waves may indicate the same job
end in both waves, provided that it occurred in the year of the first of two subsequent
waves. In such cases I only classified the first of these two job end responses as a move.
It is not clear from Hunt (2001) whether she proceeded in a similar way.
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Table A2 compares some median regression results of Hunt (2001) with those achieved
with the sample constructed for this paper (excluding agricultural workers). The set
of covariates though differs, because Hunt controlled for 27 industry dummies, while
I controlled only for eight. Nevertheless, many coefficients are quite similar in sign
and sometimes in size. Differences occur in particular with respect to the job change
variables. In this compared to Hunt’s analysis the coefficients of east Germans changing
to the west turn out to be much higher in the period 1990/91 and somewhat higher in
the period 1991/92 to 1995/96. Moreover, for east Germans in this latter period the
coefficient of a voluntary change indicates a wage gain that is about two percentage
points higher than in Hunt’s analysis. Finally, involuntary job change is associated with
larger wage losses as in Hunt’s analysis when we regard east Germans in the period
1991/92 to 1995/96 and west Germans in the period 1990/91 to 1995/96. The reason
for this most likely is again that job loss due to terminating a temporary contract in my
analysis is classified as an involuntary job loss, while in Hunt’s analysis it is a voluntary
one. Note, this is not important for the sample of east Germans in the 1990/91 period
as for this period no job loss due to the end of a temporary contract is observed.
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Table A2: Median regression results for the change of log monthly
wages: Comparison of coefficients estimated with the sample underly-
ing this paper with those of Hunt (2001)a
East, 1990/91 East, 1991/92 - 1995/96 West, 1990/91 - 1995/96
Sample Hunt’s Sample Hunt’s Sample Hunt’s
sampleb samplec sampled
Female 0.0215 0.037 0.0084 0.012 0.0001 0.001
(0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.001 -0.006 -0.0009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Foreign . . . . -0.001 -0.003
. . . . (0.000) (0.002)
General schooling 0.0936 0.098 -0.0036 0.016 . .
(0.075) (0.055) (0.020) (0.021) . .
General schooling German . . . . -0.005 -0.003
. . . . (0.003) (0.003)
General schooling Foreign . . . . -0.0053 -0.008
. . . . (0.004) (0.004)
University -0.065 -0.053 0.0212 0.016 0.0072 0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
Vocational training -0.0306 -0.018 -0.0021 0.001 -0.0026 -0.003
(0.017) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Civil Service . . . . 0.005 -0.001
Training . . . . (0.003) (0.003)
Tenure (months/1000) -0.0585 -0.07 0.0356 0.024 -0.0278 -0.027
(0.075) (0.069) (0.024) (0.026) (0.008) (0.010)
Working in west -0.0448 -0.04 . .
(0.008) (0.007) . .
Voluntary move 0.109 0.11 0.0478 0.029 0.0485 0.052
(0.055) (0.050) (0.027) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011)
Involuntary move 0.0564 0.042 -0.0449 -0.028 -0.0229 -0.015
(0.038) (0.032) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016)
Move reason unknown 0.2366 0.242 0.0377 0.022 -0.0143 0.136
(0.254) (0.212) (0.053) (0.035) (0.035) (0.049)
∆ working in west 0.418 0.288 0.0734 0.058 . .
(0.062) (0.075) (0.040) (0.043) . .
Industry dummiesd Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies . Yes Yes
Sample size 1382 1323 5878 5653 15010 14600
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
aBootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
b Hunt (2001) Table 3, column 3.
c Hunt (2001) Table 4, column 3.
c Hunt (2001) Table 5, column 1.
d Hunt (2001) controlled for 27 industry dummies, while this analysis controls for only eight industries.
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